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ABSTRACT
In this article we offer reflections on the final report of the
Commission on Religious Education (CoRE) that was published in
England in 2018. We expose and problematise the prominent
place of understanding in the report, not only as an educational
method, but also the underlying world view of the report itself,
a world view which we characterise as ‘hermeneuticism’. We raise
educational, theological and political concerns about the particular
approach taken in the report. We propose instead that religious
education (RE) should be considered first of all in terms of what it
means to live with a religious or non-religious orientation, con-
ceived in existential terms rather than in terms of beliefs or prac-
tices or objectified world views. Educationally we show that what
we term a non-hermeneutic way of viewing our humanity would








The final report from the Commission on Religious Education (CoRE 2018) makes
a convincing case for the need for action. The investigations made by the Commission
show fairly conclusively that provision of religious education (RE) in England and Wales
is patchy, and whilst there are some examples of very good practice around the country,
this is frequently also not the case. The report spells out very clearly how the situation for
RE has been undermined by a number of government initiatives, including academisation
(which particularly has contributed to the erosion of the local infrastructure for RE) and
changes to accountability and performance measures (such as the English Baccalaureate
(EBacc), which has significantly contributed to the marginalisation of RE in the secondary
school curriculum). The report also shows that provision for initial teacher education for
RE in primary schools is non-existent or at best minimal. Against this background, the
report makes 11 recommendations which are intended to ‘enable all pupils in all schools
to receive a high-quality education in Religion and Worldviews’ and to ‘support and
strengthen the subject for the foreseeable future’ (2018, 10). This is in large part done
through the proposal for a ‘national entitlement’ understood as a ‘set of organising
principles which form the basis for developing programmes of study’ (32).
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In the reflections we offer in this article – first through consideration of the first two
main proposals in the report: (1) changing the name of the subject; and (2) making
a case for a ‘national entitlement’ – we begin to expose what seems to be the main
assumption underlying these recommendations. In particular, we want to make an
intervention that problematises the prominent place of understanding in the report, not
just as a method for RE but also, and perhaps first and foremost, as the underlying
world view of the report itself. In our view, the emphasis on understanding has come
about largely because of the fact that the two constituent dimensions of RE – religion
and education – have received insufficient attention in the report. This, as we will
conclude, also has problematic implications for the role and position of RE in the public
sphere.
From ‘Religious Education’ to ‘Religion and Worldviews’
The first recommendation of the report is that the name of the subject should be
changed from ‘Religious Education’ to ‘Religion and Worldviews’ and that this change
should be reflected in subsequent legislation and guidance. This is an interesting
proposal, particularly because it puts religion in the wider context of world views,
and thus potentially offers a broader framing for the subject than an exclusive focus on
religion or religious world views would do. One question, however, is what the adop-
tion of the idea of world view entails. In the introduction, a world view is described as ‘a
person’s way of understanding, experiencing and responding to the world’, and also as
‘a philosophy of life or an approach to life, which includes how a person understands
the nature of reality and their own place in the world’. And: ‘A person’s worldview is
likely to influence and be influenced by their beliefs, values, behaviours, experiences,
identities and commitments’ (4). The report does acknowledge that the notion of world
view is not perfect (31), but nonetheless is workable: ‘the best fit . . . the best available
catch-all term to describe both religious and non-religious approaches to life’ (31).
In our view the choice for the idea of ‘world view’ clearly reveals the ‘frame’ of the
report itself – a ‘frame’ we suggest referring to as ‘hermeneuticism’.1 ‘Hermeneuticism’
stands for the idea that: (1) the human being is fundamentally a sense-making and
meaning-making being; (2) that his or her being in the world is mainly or first and
foremost a matter of sense- or meaning-making; and (3) that religious and non-
religious world views play a key role in such sense-making. Although there is some
acknowledgement that world views are about more than beliefs – reference is made to
practices (see, for example, item 4 of the entitlement; 12), which means that world views
are not entirely seen as cognitive belief-systems – it is also very clear that world views
are basically understood as ‘frames’ for sense making. For example, in item 6 of the
entitlement, we read:
[Pupils must be taught] how worldviews may offer responses to fundamental questions of
meaning and purpose raised by human experience, and the different roles that worldviews
play in providing people with ways of making sense of their lives. (12; emphasis added)
If this is, in a sense, a meta-perspective for education – the suggestion here is that pupils
must be taught how world views ‘work’2 – there is also a much bolder claim in the
report with regard to this, namely that ‘it is one of the core tasks of education to enable
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each pupil to understand, reflect on and develop their own personal worldview’ (5;
emphasis added). Although it may sound attractive to think of education as the place
where each pupil can develop their own personal world view, this suggestion – which is
very common in contemporary education discourse – is actually rather problematic.
This is because it fails to understand that the real task of education is never just to let
everything emerge, but that the more important and more difficult task is to help
children and young people to gain a perspective on the personal world view they may
want to develop. Key here is the question whether the world view children may want to
develop and make their own is going to help them with living well, individually and
collectively, or whether the favoured world view will hinder this, in the short or longer
term. Education, to put it briefly, is therefore never about mere flourishing – letting
a hundred flowers bloom, developing the child’s ‘full potential’ or ‘all their talents’ – but
also has a ‘duty to resist’ (Meirieu 2007; Biesta 2015), at least in order to bring children
and young people ‘into conversation’ with the world view they desire.3
A national entitlement
The second key recommendation in the report is that of a national entitlement. In our
view this is an interesting way to address the key issues RE is currently facing, particularly
with regard to the patchy character of provision. At the very same time, the idea of
a national entitlement also poses a serious challenge for the field, because it is one thing to
argue that everyone should be entitled to good RE, but still another to ask how provision of
good quality can be achieved everywhere and for everyone. With regard to the latter, it is
remarkable that the report suggests that a national entitlement is best served by a national
effort – to be initiated, coordinated and further developed by a committee of nine people –
rather than through a strengthening and in some cases re-building of the local infra-
structure (including the Standing Advisory Councils on Religious Education [SACRE]).
One obvious question to raise is about the proposed composition of the committee
of nine where, in the current proposals, academic input is relatively marginal. Our point
here is not that of creating particular roles or positions but is linked to a wider concern
about the report, namely the absence of any explicit engagement with literature,
scholarship and research. This makes it first of all very difficult to see what the
proposals are actually based upon. More importantly, it makes it difficult to see what
choices were made, what options were considered but rejected, and what the justifica-
tion, intellectual or otherwise, for all this may have been. This is particularly worrying
in light of the report’s emphasis on the need for promoting the value of scholarship (see
for example 13) because, at least in its presentation, the report does not live up to this
need. Rather than assuming that the report provides a sufficiently developed blue-print
for the subject and the field and can therefore go straight into ‘implementation &
action’ mode, we think that further work on the underpinning and justification of what
is being proposed is needed, perhaps rather urgently.
Educational concerns
Although there is no particular exploration in the report of what it is that education
as a whole should seek to achieve, sections 3 and 4 and of Appendix 2 seem to be
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where the underlying educational assumptions of the report start to become more
visible, leading us once more to identify what we have termed the ‘hermeneuticism’
of the report. While a more detailed discussion of hermeneuticism will have to come
later, there are two concerns that we want to raise in the context of our reflections.
The first is educational; the second is ‘at least’ existential, which means that it is
political, theological, and in a sense educational as well. The issues are particularly
visible in Appendix 2, perhaps epitomised in the following to two claims: (1) That
‘the subject matter of RE as worldviews’ is about ‘(t)he individual process of making
sense of life and making meaning of experience’ (72); and (2) That central to the
‘aims, purposes and nature of Religion and Worldviews’ is ‘understanding the
human quest for meaning’ (73).
With regard to the educational point, it is important to see that the report not only
has a hermeneutic understanding of human beings and their ways of existing in the
world, but also thinks of education itself predominantly as a hermeneutic exercise, that
is an exercise that functions as and should result in understanding, particularly under-
standing of what world views are, how they operate, and which world views there are.
When, in the description of the entitlement, we read that ‘teaching must promote
openness, respect for others, objectivity, scholarly accuracy and critical enquiry’ (13),
the question immediately emerges how teaching should do this, also bearing in mind
that these ambitions are rather huge. The main answer provided in the report seems to
be: through working on (better) understanding. On page 26, for example, the report
says that ‘(y)oung people need both to understand the worldviews of others and reflect
on their own’ and on page 27 it says that ‘understanding worldviews enables young
people to understand a wide range of human experience’. There are also quotes from
young people that seem to indicate that because they have enhanced understanding,
they have become able to establish respectful friendships ‘across difference’, but such
quotes are rather selective and mainly seem to provide illustration.
One could of course say that it is wonderful when this happens, that is, when
enhanced understanding does lead to a change in attitude, but the claim that under-
standing is the key ‘mechanism’ here, cannot be substantiated. Understanding does not
automatically translate into emphatic action, if that phrase is useful here, a point
brought home pretty well when Homer Simpson, in an episode of The Simpsons,
said to his children: ‘just because I don’t care, doesn’t mean I don’t understand’ (for
a detailed discussion see Biesta 2017a). The point here is, that understanding does not
automatically translate into care, or respect, or friendship, and educationally it might
therefore actually be better to radically disconnect the two. This would amount to saying
that understanding is a laudable aim for education. Indeed, promoting care and respect
may also be a laudable aim, but our point is that there is no automatic connection from
the one to the other. This is also because enhanced understanding can lead to the
opposite: to disrespect, hate, and so on. Terrorists, to make the point one more time,
tend to have a very good understanding of other people’s world views; that is to say they
have made their own meaning from such world views. The problem lies in the
consequences they draw from such understanding, that is, what motivates their actions
and prompts them to act. This is where educational hermeneuticism runs into pro-
blems, and the report seems to be largely unaware of this, which seems to indicate that
education may turn out to be one of the ‘forgotten dimensions’ in the report.4
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Existential concerns (1): theology
The other problem we see with regard to the hermeneuticism of the report is existential,
having to do with the fact that the report relies on a very particular an unquestioned
view of the human being and its place in and relation with the world. This, as we have
already mentioned, is the idea of the human being as a sense- and meaning-making
being for whom the world, social and natural, appears as an object of sense- and
meaning-making. One question is whether or not such a view of the human being
‘makes sense’. Another question is whether such a view is inevitable, that is, whether it
is the only way to articulate the place of the human being in the world. With regard to
the latter question, we can at least point to the work of philosophers such as Heidegger,
Sartre and Levinas, who all have tried to articulate rather different accounts of the way
in which human beings are in the world – thrown into the world, with a duty to care for
the world, condemned to be free, addressed by the world, and so on.5 What the
implications of such accounts are, lies beyond the scope of these reflections, but the
existence of non-, a- or even anti-hermeneutic accounts of the human being at least
indicates that the hermeneuticism informing the report is a particular choice that,
therefore, needs justification.
These questions are not just philosophical. There is also a theological corollary to the
point we are making here, because an idea that seems to be completely absent in the
conception of the human being presented in the report is that of revelation, that is, that
rather than that human beings ‘make sense’ and ‘give meaning’, something is actually
given to them that radically breaks through such meaning-making. ‘Decentred’ con-
ceptions of the human being are, to put it differently, not the prerogative of twentieth-
century philosophy, but are also key to religious and theological traditions. Perhaps this
is the most important reason why we wish to suggest that a proposal for the future of
RE cannot, without further discussion, rely on an anthropocentric or ‘immanent’ world
view.6 The fact that this discussion is absent in the report may indicate that religion
appears as the other ‘forgotten dimension’ in the discussion (Hannam and Biesta 2019).
Existential concerns (2): politics
A further consequence of the approach taken in the report is the risk that the
child or young person is mainly positioned as an ‘understander’ or interpreter of
things others put before them – which would become even more of an issue if
assessment and examination would focus predominantly on how well pupils have
‘performed’ in the task of understanding. This puts pressure on the possibility of
what, after Hannah Arendt, we could term their ‘natality’, that is, their capacity to
begin and to bring their beginnings into the world. This is not a matter of self-
expression and even less so of choice – hence our concerns about the idea that
education should merely be about children developing their ‘own’ world view –
but is fundamentally political in that, again following Arendt, the only way in
which our beginnings can come into the world, is in their ‘meeting’ of the
beginnings of others, which will necessarily transform, disrupt and in some cases
even destroy our beginnings.
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Yet this is precisely the ‘human condition’ (Arendt 1958), that is, the way in which
human beings can ‘appear’ in the world, with others, rather than remain entirely private
and for themselves. Where education is considered as being the kind of activity
primarily concerned with bringing the child to understand, the possibility of action,
of taking initiative and letting such initiative ‘go’ into the world of plurality and
difference, will be significantly curtailed. If education and, more specifically, RE has
a concern for the public sphere, for the life we live together with others, it needs to make
sure that children and young people can begin and, most crucially, encounter the
beginnings of others in this process.7
The loss of such an understanding of what political life, life in the polis, life in the
presence of others, can be seen in a very practical way in recommendation 8. This is
where the report proposes the establishment of Local Advisory Networks for Religion
and Worldviews (LANRW) to replace the existing SACRE. The disengagement of these
new bodies from the democratic processes in England, illustrates starkly the way in
which the proposals in this report seem to move aside from the public sphere, placing it
instead in the context of the contemporary educational market place. What is distinc-
tive about the existing SACREs is the presence of locally elected members of govern-
ment, which ties them fundamentally into democratic accountability. Shifting the new
body into a context where there is no clear accountability, save to itself, runs the danger
of placing RE outside of the public sphere, so that it becomes less able to make its
unique contribution there.
And what about teachers and their teaching?
A final set of problems we would like to identify, relates to the teacher and what she is
to do and to seek to achieve, as a consequence of her teaching. Section 6 (45–51),
entitled ‘Developing High Quality Teaching’, cites two reports, one carried out by
National Association of Teachers of Religious Education (NATRE) and another by
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Both are
intended to justify the report’s emphasis on subject knowledge, assuming that if only
the teacher had enough specialist knowledge, standards in RE would improve. However,
this idea, taken together with educational assumptions and positioning the child as
a ‘meaning-maker’ or ‘understander’, reduces the teacher to the role of ‘facilitator’ or
‘enabler’ of children’s making of meaning and understanding and thus dissolves the
unique ‘work’ of teaching and the teacher in the educational process (see Biesta and
Hannam 2016).
There are also theological and political consequences present for the teacher in the
report. Theologically, the approach taken in the report limits the way in which religion
(and world views) are conceptualised; restricted to the kinds of things that are believed
or practiced and therefore capable of being studied objectively in some way. This risks
relegating the teacher to a kind of technician, who needs to find the right ‘methods’ to
deliver a curriculum that apparently can ‘promote openness, respect for others, objec-
tivity, scholarly accuracy and critical enquiry’ (35). What it means to live a life with
a world view is objectified as something to be studied; any question as to the signifi-
cance of living a life with a religious orientation in existential terms is missing from the
report. This will have political consequences too, since the power of what it is to live
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a human life with a religious or other orientation runs the risk of disappearing from the
educational conversation.
Where the existential dimension is included, the role of the teacher becomes that of
bringing the child to attend, not to any particular thing necessarily but to a different
position in relation to the world (see Biesta and Hannam 2016; Hannam 2019 for more
extended discussions of this). In understanding her role as bringing the child to
‘attention, intellectual humility and discernment’ (Weil 1965) the teacher has scope
for bringing all ways in which it is possible to live a life into the classroom. There will be
intellectual engagement but also discernment regarding how to live life, as the child’s
beginnings meet those of others. The teacher has a responsibility here in all the many
ways she lives and moves with children in the school. Clearly the possibilities from this
are less than certain (Hannam 2018), however in Arendtian terms, this is how action is
possible and where the public sphere can exist.
Conclusion
There is much to commend the report for in terms of its intentions to remedy
increasingly patchy provision of RE across the country as well as identifying what has
brought this about, namely academisation and changes to the accountability measures.
However, in this article we have sought to identify what we see as the main short-
comings of the report and have argued that these should be addressed as a matter of
urgency before the whole endeavour goes into implementation mode. Our concerns
flow from what we have termed the ‘hermeneuticism’ of the report. We have sought to
show how, if left unattended, particular assumptions regarding educational purpose will
become dominant. These are assumptions that will limit what teachers can achieve and
how they are to do that, regardless of what the subject is called. We have also identified
a shortcoming regarding the theological positioning of religion and world views. Here
religion is predominantly conceptualised as belief and practice, which runs the risk of
objectifying religion and reducing the teacher to a facilitator or technician. Finally, we
have sought to reveal the political implications of the assumptions upon which this
report is resting. The likely consequence of moving too quickly into implementation
mode, especially if this is handed over to commercial organisations without the
measured guidance of serious scholarship, will be the loss of the public sphere.
Arendt has warned of the dangers of replacing the public sphere, which is the space
of appearance, with economics (see for example, Arendt 1951). We commend this
warning loud and clear to the Religious Education Council as they seek to act on the
recommendations of the report.
We would propose what we might term a non-hermeneutical alternative. This would
be one which approaches both education and religion from a different angle (see for
example Biesta 2017c; Hannam 2019; Biesta & Hannam 2019). In this alternative
proposal, educational questions would be considered first and foremost and questions
about what it means to live with a religious or non-religious orientation considered in
existential terms and not only as beliefs or practices or objectified world views.
Educationally we would want to show that a non-hermeneutic way of viewing our
humanity would open different possibilities for what the teacher should seek to achieve
in her relationships with children and young people in school. Further, were these
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dimensions considered first, were bringing the child to speak and act in a world of others
taken as the organising principle of an RE curriculum, things might look rather different.
Notes
1. We use the rather awkward term ‘hermeneuticism’ to distinguish it from hermeneutics.
Our concern here is not with the role that understanding may or may not play in
education – albeit that we have questions about that as well – but first of all with the
underlying view of human beings, their place in and their relationships with the world. For
a more detailed analysis and critique of ‘hermeneuticism’ in contemporary education see,
for example, Biesta (2016).
2. An interesting ‘case’ for such an approach can be found in Enoch (2004), who builds on
the work of Kenneth Burke; see also Rutten and Soetaert (2012) and, for a critical
discussion, Biesta (2012).
3. Elsewhere in the report there is an awareness of this predicament, when it is stated that ‘some
types of extremism . . . draw on particular religious and non-religious worldviews’ (28). But to
suggest that those with extremist world views don’t understand what a world view is – see
page 28, section 28 – is rather naïve, as one could also argue that those holding extremist
world views, know rather well what a world view is, and what it is capable of.
4. On the idea that education and religion are forgotten dimensions of religious education see
Hannam and Biesta (2019).
5. At this point we only refer to a number of significant alternatives within contemporary
Western philosophy. There are, of course, also non-Western and older, pre-modern,
accounts of the human being that differ significantly from hermeneuticism.
6. For a discussion of the educational implications of immanence and transcendence see
Biesta (2017b).
7. For a detailed discussion of these dynamics and an argument for the need for education to
be in, with and for the public sphere and public existence, see Hannam (2019).
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